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Like “Monkeys at the Zoo”: 
Politics and the  
Performance of Disability  
at the Iowa Soldiers’ Home, 1887–1910 
BRIAN EDWARD DONOVAN 
WHEN THE IOWA SOLDIERS’ HOME opened its doors in 
December 1887, the Civil War had been over for 22 years. Vet-
erans of the conflict were entering middle age; for most, their 
army service was rapidly taking on the glow of nostalgia.1 In 
most midwestern towns, the local post of the Grand Army of 
the Republic (GAR) and its auxiliaries in the Women’s Relief 
Corps (WRC) acted as a kind of community social club, organiz-
ing Fourth of July parades, ice cream socials, and Decoration 
Day commemorations. Uninjured veterans had transitioned in-
to civilian careers more or less smoothly after demobilization, 
and by the late 1880s an ever more generous pension system 
provided a moderate (if far from princely) living for honorably 
scarred old soldiers. For those men too damaged by war to 
                                                
1. The typical Civil War enlistee was about 23 years old, so the average veteran 
in 1887 would have been about 45. For this and other statistics, see especially 
Maris Vinovskis, Toward a Social History of the American Civil War: Exploratory 
Essays (New York, 1990). See also James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: 
The Civil War Era (New York, 1988). On veterans’ nostalgia in the broader con-
text of Gilded Age culture, see especially David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: 
The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, MA, 2001). 
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work, or bereft of the family or communal support necessary 
for independent living, the National Home for Disabled Volun-
teer Soldiers (NHDVS) provided asylum care at taxpayer ex-
pense for those who qualified.2  
 This last provision was crucial. By 1885, the federal govern-
ment had already spent nearly $180 million on pension arrears, 
but it was still not enough.3 The ironclad logic of bureaucracies 
dictates that even the most progressive social assistance scheme 
will not reach all the needy; thanks to the requirement that dis-
abilities be provably service-related, many suffering Union vet-
erans were unable to tap into federal assistance programs. The 
sight of old soldiers in state poorhouses—or, worse, begging in 
the streets—was increasingly common in northern states dur-
ing the Gilded Age. “That all soldiers have earned all that their 
friends ask for them there can be no doubt,” the Oskaloosa Herald 
thundered in a typical editorial. “Will we go on record, like 
those of the past who suffered their benefactors after having 
given their fortune and their strength to their nation in her hour 
of peril, to die in the poorhouse or be dependent upon the chari-
ties of society?”4  
 The problem was largely political. Starting in 1885, pension 
payments to disabled Union soldiers and their dependents was 
the single largest expenditure in the federal budget behind serv-
ice on the national debt. That would continue until 1897, by 
which time nearly a million men were on the rolls; by 1907, 
                                                
2. For GAR activities, see especially Stuart Charles McConnell, Glorious Con-
tentment: The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865–1900 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992). 
For pensions, the standard reference remains William Henry Glasson and 
David Kinley, Federal Military Pensions in the United States (New York, 1918). 
See also Larry M. Logue and Peter David Blanck, Race, Ethnicity, and Disability: 
Veterans and Benefits in Post–Civil War America (New York, 2010); and Peter 
David Blanck, “Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the 
Politics of Disability in America,” Alabama Law Review 52 (2000), 1–50. On the 
NHDVS, see Patrick J. Kelly, Creating a National Home: Building the Veterans’ 
Welfare State, 1860–1900 (Cambridge, MA, 1997). 
3. McConnell, Glorious Contentment, 147; Kelly, Creating a National Home, 5. 
4. See, for instance, McConnell, Glorious Contentment, 142. An 1885 study by 
the Pennsylvania GAR found between 300 and 400 men in the Common-
wealth’s poorhouses. The presence of old soldiers in Iowa poorhouses is a 
nearly constant refrain in Republican Party newspapers throughout the pe-
riod. See, for example, Oskaloosa Herald, 6/6/1887. 
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this largesse had totaled more than $1 billion.5 In addition, the 
NHDVS had six branches by 1887, and plans were in the works 
for two more (in Marion, Indiana, and Santa Monica, California, 
both opened in 1888). Forcing through more federal-level assis-
tance would be problematic, to say the least, in light of these 
enormous sums, especially with Democrat Grover Cleveland in 
the White House. The GAR’s arrogance did not help matters: 
“The GAR own this country by the rights of a conqueror,” 
money-hungry New York comrades asserted in 1886. It is 
hardly surprising that not long afterwards Cleveland vetoed 
the Grand Army’s proposed “service pension”.6 Clearly a state-
level solution had to be found for the problem of desperately 
needy men without clear proof of service-related disability.  
 Iowa’s solution was the Iowa Soldiers’ Home (ISH), which 
dovetailed neatly with the Iowa GAR’s political agenda. A po-
litically crucial state throughout the 1880s and ‘90s, Iowa had 
been strongly Republican during the war years. Beginning in 
1878, however, declining farm prices and populist agitation 
challenged GOP dominance of the state. That year, the Green-
back-Labor Party sent two Iowans to the 46th Congress. Two 
years later, one of those congressmen, former Union general 
James B. Weaver, would head the Greenback presidential ticket 
and capture just over 3 percent of the national popular vote. 
With much Greenback support coming from the Midwest, the 
“soldier vote” was crucial for keeping Iowa within the Republi-
can fold. By pushing through a state soldiers’ home, the Iowa 
GAR could aid its destitute comrades while shoring up veteran 
support for the state Republican Party. The ISH was given an 
initial appropriation of $100,000—$75,000 for construction of 
the physical plant and a $25,000 “support fund” from which 
to pay officers, purchase supplies, and provide for residents 
(called “inmates”) at $10 per man per month.7  
                                                
5. Kelly, Creating a National Home, 153.  
6. McConnell, Glorious Contentment, 156.  
7. For more detailed analyses of Iowa politics in this period, see especially 
Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–
1896 (Chicago, 1971); Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of 
Midwestern Politics, 1850–1900, 2nd ed. (New York, 1970); and Ballard Camp-
bell, Representative Democracy: Public Policy and Midwestern Legislatures in the 
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OPEN TO ALL honorably discharged veterans of the Union 
army and navy, the ISH was tasked with providing living space 
and medical care to those veterans “unable to earn a ¼ living at 
manual labor.” Those soldiers drawing pensions would contrib-
ute all but $6 of their checks to the home’s maintenance fund; that, 
the commissioners hoped, would make the ISH self-sufficient. 
It was not to be. 
 Although the home “opened with [just] seven inmates” in 
December 1887, Commandant Milo Smith soon found himself 
swamped with more applications than his facilities could handle. 
By January 1888 there were 66 old soldiers in the home, with 30 
additional applicants approved for admission and 90 more appli-
cations issued and being prepared for admission. “The present 
indications are that the Home will be filled to its full capacity 
during the year 1888,” Smith concluded. The commissioners 
concurred and requested an appropriation of $2,750 “for 200 
more inmates than now provided for.”8  
 As the nation’s veteran population aged, the number of men 
in the ISH grew dramatically, rising to 360 “crippled and depen-
dent” old soldiers in 1890 and 585 (“including twelve women”) 
by 1895. Overcrowding was endemic. As the 1895 report re-
minded the state legislature, the ISH was designed to house 
“no more than 300 inmates.” Moreover, although an 1889 act of 
Congress supplemented the home’s budget by paying $100 per 
inmate to each state soldiers’ home, the ISH, like all state insti-
tutions (and, indeed, the NHDVS) remained overcrowded and 
underfunded.9  
                                                                                                    
Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA, 1980). On the Greenback Party, see 
especially Mark A. Lause, The Civil War’s Last Campaign: James B. Weaver, the 
Greenback-Labor Party and the Politics of Race and Section (Lanham, MD, 2001). 
See also Thomas Burnell Colbert, “James Baird Weaver and the Election of 1878” 
(M.A. thesis, University of Iowa, 1975). For a detailed analysis of the Iowa GAR 
in state politics, see Charles Thurman Mindling, “The Grand Army of the Re-
public in Iowa Society and Politics” (M.A. thesis, University of Iowa, 1949). 
Statistics come from Report of the Board of Commissioners of the Iowa Soldiers’ 
Home to the Twenty-Second General Assembly (Des Moines, 1888), 3–7 (hereafter 
cited as Commissioners Report, [year]. 
8. Commissioners Report, 1888, 8–9. 
9. Commissioners Report, 1895, 3. On the 1889 act, see Commissioners Report, 
1889, 14–15. For the NHDVS, see especially Kelly, Creating a National Home. 
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 As a piece of political theater, though, the establishment of 
the ISH was quite effective. Cities lobbied the state for the privi-
lege of hosting the home, and the legislature made a show of 
consulting the GAR for its input; a special senate commission 
visited 19 possible locations and compiled a “voluminous re-
port . . . mentioning the desirable features of each.”10 
Marshalltown offered the most attractive package. Thanks to its 
generous donation of 128 acres, a free extension of the city’s wa-
ter mains (and free pumping for five years), a rail link, and low-
cost gas hookups, that city was chosen for the honor. The ISH 
opened its doors with great fanfare in December 1887.11  
 Maintaining the home, however, soon became an ongoing 
public relations headache. Unlike the state’s insane asylums, 
prisons, poorhouses, and vocational schools for the blind, deaf, 
and dumb, the ISH was not designed to rehabilitate unfortu-
nates or to exclude undesirables from society. Like its federal 
counterpart, the NHDVS, the Iowa home was, fundamentally, 
a temporary refuge for transient veterans and a warehouse for 
the chronically ill. The grateful citizens of Iowa would not allow 
their ailing defenders to languish in poorhouses, the GAR in-
sisted. But as Henry Bellows, the wartime chairman of the U.S. 
Sanitary Commission, argued as early as 1863, institutional 
                                                
10. Alton Weekly Democrat, 4/3/1886; Cedar Rapids Evening Gazette, 4/4/1886.  
11. Commissioners Report, 1888, 5. 
 
The Iowa Soldiers’ Home in 1895. From State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Des Moines. 
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charity on this scale “would inevitably degrade these men, cor-
rupt their character, and sap their will, forever undermining 
their manhood and locking them into a state of perpetual de-
pendence.”12 Such an insult to a crucial voting bloc was unac-
ceptable. What the ISH provided, then, must actually be charity 
without seeming so.  
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION, politically and culturally, was to 
invoke what sociologist T. H. Marshall would come to call 
“martial citizenship,” the informal but very influential set of 
privileges veterans and others can claim based on their defense 
of the state.13 Disabled veterans requiring institutional care 
would be classed with the “deserving poor”—the only fit ob-
jects for Gilded Age charity—but in return, they would perform 
their disability for taxpayers, marching to and fro to the call of 
the bugle in their Union army uniforms and serving, in the 
words of one embittered resident of the NHDVS, “as much [of] 
an exhibition here as monkeys at the Zoo.”14 Soldiers’ homes 
like the one at Marshalltown would become tourist attractions, 
with thousands of residents flocking there annually on national 
holidays (usually aided by special rates offered by local railways) 
to see the old soldiers.15 With these exhibitions, the state (and, of 
course, the Republican Party) displayed its munificence, while 
the citizens had the opportunity to confirm that they were get-
ting their money’s worth. The home’s officers thus found them-
selves acting as both administrators and camp commandants, 
publicly enforcing military discipline on old, feeble men. 
 The uniformed, disciplinary aspect was crucial, for it was of-
ten difficult to tell if residents were disabled. Gilded Age Ameri-
cans associated the Civil War with grievous, visible wounds, 
especially amputations. The official seal of the NHDVS, for 
instance, showed Columbia offering succor to an old soldier 
                                                
12. Quoted in Kelly, Creating a National Home, 23.  
13. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays (Westport, 
CT, 1973). See also idem, “Social Citizenship and the Defense of Welfare Pro-
vision,” in Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (New 
York, 1993). 
14. Quoted in Kelly, Creating a National Home, 187. 
15. See ibid., 183–200. 
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missing his right leg.16 Moreover, visibly wounded men often 
played up their missing limbs, especially on the campaign trail. 
Amputee veterans typically pinned up their clothing, especially 
in photographs, while disabled politicians like Daniel Sickles 
and Lucius Fairchild made a claim to voters’ special considera-
tion by virtue of their loss. With these associations in mind, visi-
tors to the nation’s soldiers’ homes expected missing limbs.17 
 Most Civil War casualties, however, were not amputees. Of 
the 2.2 million men who passed through the Union army, only 
281,881 men, or 1.4 percent, were visibly wounded, and slightly 
                                                
16. Ibid., 128. 
17. See especially Laurann Figg and Jane Farrell-Beck, “Amputation in the Civil 
War: Physical and Social Dimensions,” Journal of the History of Medical and Allied 
Sciences 48 (1993), 454–75. Figg and Farrell-Beck carefully analyzed a broad sam-
ple of photographs of disabled veterans to come to these conclusions. Against 
this notion of proud amputees, however, see Lisa Herschbach, “Prosthetic Re-
constructions: Making the Industry, Re-Making the Body, Modelling the Nation,” 
History Workshop Journal 44 (1997), 23–57; and Erin O’Connor, “ ‘Fractions of Men’: 
Engendering Amputation in Victorian Culture,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 39 (1997), 744–47. Frances Clarke, in her study of Civil War injuries, 
addresses these two interpretations of Civil War amputations. See Frances Clarke, 
“ ‘Honorable Scars’: Northern Amputees and the Meaning of Civil War Injuries,” 
in Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller, Union Soldiers and the Northern Home 
Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments (New York, 2002), 364–65. 
 
Members of GAR Post 116 in Indianola pose for a photo in 1908. Note that 
an amputee was placed front and center in the photo. Photo from State His-
torical Society of Iowa, Des Moines. 
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fewer than 30,000 were missing body parts.18 Even then, the dam-
age was often not visibly dramatic, as most Civil War amputa-
tions were of fingers or a hand.19 Instead, disease was the real 
scourge of both armies, carrying off 224,000 Union soldiers out-
right and more or less permanently affecting the health of hun-
dreds of thousands more. The Union army’s medical services 
treated an astounding seven million cases of disease during the 
course of the war. Dysentery alone, which could permanently 
affect a man’s health, appeared an astonishing 1.7 million times 
—nearly one case for every man who had ever worn the blue.20 
After the war, men who had suffered illness during their ser-
vice often appeared outwardly normal, even healthy, but were 
more or less disabled for the purpose of earning a steady living.  
 Those were the men most in need of aid. At the end of the 
war, approximately 15 percent of all surviving veterans had been 
wounded, and thus virtually guaranteed a pension, but by 1875 
fewer than half of them had claimed their benefit. Even more 
surprisingly, only about 9,000 amputees applied for their auto-
matic pension, and even fewer took advantage of the federal 
government’s free artificial limbs. In a study of 100 amputees’ 
pension files, historian Frances Clark found that most men took 
cash commutations instead. The veteran-oriented newsletter The 
Soldier’s Friend even suggested a lively (though apocryphal) trade 
in artificial limb vouchers sold at a discount. Clarke attributes 
these counterintuitive findings to a veterans’ culture of masculin-
ity. Whatever the cause, it is clear that most men requiring state 
aid were not battlefield casualties, but victims of camp disease.21  
                                                
18. Theda Skocpol, “America’s First Social Security System: The Expansion of 
Benefits for Civil War Veterans,” Political Science Quarterly 108 (1993), 85–86. 
See also idem, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social 
Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA, 1992). 
19. Robert I. Goler and Michael G. Rhode, “From Individual Trauma to Na-
tional Policy: Tracking the Uses of Civil War Veteran Medical Records,” in 
Disabled Veterans in History, ed. David A. Gerber (Ann Arbor, MI, 2000), 164. 
20. Kelly, Creating a National Home, 15–17. 
21. Skocpol, “America’s First Social Security System,” 95; Clarke, “Honorable 
Scars”; The Soldier’s Friend 2, no. 1 (1866), 2. On manhood, see Clarke, “Honor-
able Scars,” esp. 378–83; and Brian Donovan, “The Harder Heroism of the Hos-
pital: Manhood and Disability in Midwestern Soldiers’ Homes, 1884–1910” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, forthcoming).  
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 Complete statistics unfortunately do not exist for the ISH— 
Home Surgeon Hamilton P. Duffield’s reports only listed men 
who had been in the hospital, and then only by diagnosis—but 
a sample of admission files reveals an inmate profile roughly 
similar to that of the NHDVS. At the NHDVS’s Northwestern 
Branch in Milwaukee, which opened in 1868, fewer than half of 
the applications in the first five years were based on combat in-
juries, and at the Northern Branch in Togus, Maine, amputees 
never made up more than 22 percent of the total population. 
A survey of 612 Northern Branch inmates conducted between 
1866 and 1881 confirmed that illness, in peace as in war, felled 
far more men than bullets: a mere 8 percent of the residents 
were found to be amputees, and only 38 percent were suffering 
from the direct effects of wounds. The rest were sick.22 
 
ILL INMATES confounded the public’s expectations. Worse, 
their comrades’ behavior exacerbated the situation. By the time 
the ISH opened in 1887, the country had more than 20 years’ ex-
perience with institutional assistance to ex-soldiers. The results 
were decidedly mixed. Almost every debarkation point in the 
Union had had its municipal “soldiers’ rest,” where men return-
ing from the front could get a meal and a bed. Those institutions 
quickly grew into hospitals for ill or wounded transients, and 
many Union soldiers expressed their gratitude for the care re-
ceived there. However, as General Benjamin Butler, the first 
commandant of the NHDVS, was forced to admit to Congress 
in 1868, the urban settings of these soldiers’ rests provided 
“temptations to vice, of which intemperateness and unchaste-
ness are most common; and we find in our hospitals many men 
sorely afflicted with diseases arising from these causes addi-
tional to the wounds and disabilities received in the line of 
duty.” The next year he admitted that local soldiers’ homes 
were “little more than places for [a soldier] to sleep in at night, 
                                                
22. James Marten, “Exempt from the Ordinary Rules of Life: Researching Post-
war Adjustment Problems of Union Veterans,” Civil War History 47 (2001), 62; 
Kelly, Creating a National Home, 128–29, 73. I am grateful to the staff of the Iowa 
Veterans’ Home at Marshalltown, Iowa, for their generous assistance in ob-
taining a sample of veteran records. Special thanks are due to Roxy West, ar-
chivist, and Commandant David G. Worley.  
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and to get his meals in when he chose to come to them, while he 
himself wandered around the cities begging, if doing no worse, 
during the day.”23 
 As the board of managers of the NHDVS rather delicately 
put it in 1875, a “large number of not the most deserving class 
of soldiers were among the earliest to claim support,” and a 
great many of those earliest claimants “had never done much 
service.” They “had never been any special value as soldiers,” 
and they had failed to develop “the habits of industry or even 
the will to earn a living themselves [and were] quite willing to 
be supported by the Government without labor.”24 By war’s 
end, then, men without visible wounds were often assumed to 
be drunks, satyrs, loafers, or some combination of all three. 
 The experience of the NHDVS compounded the problem. 
By 1887, the public perception of soldiers’ homes as sinks of in-
iquity was well advanced, thanks largely to the behavior of res-
idents at the two nearest branches. “The sight of NHDVS resi-
dents collapsed after a drinking spree was common in every 
town located near a branch of the network,” Patrick Kelly notes; 
the Central Branch at Dayton, Ohio, alone was surrounded by 
“25 or 26” saloons (many of which also functioned as brothels). 
The inmates confined there were “constant sufferers” from the 
debilitating effects of their Civil War service, the National Tribune 
argued in August 1884, and therefore it was “not surprising . . . 
that some of them have sought the solace of the intoxicating 
cup, and have fallen victims to its destroying influence.”25 That 
the National Tribune, the GAR’s national newspaper of record, 
was forced to make such an argument speaks to the perceived 
decadence of the Dayton Home. 
 The situation at the Northwestern Branch in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, was actually worse. In 1881 alone, more than 800 
infractions out of a total of 1,840 were for drunkenness; in 1887–
1888, alcohol-related infractions topped 3,000. Drink accounted 
for a whopping 55 percent of all offenses at the Northwestern 
                                                
23. Quoted in Kelly, Creating a National Home, 105. 
24. Annual Reports of the Board of Managers of the National Asylum for Dis-
abled Volunteer Soldiers for 1868, 1869, and 1875, quoted in Kelly, Creating a 
National Home, 5. 
25. Kelly, Creating a National Home, 176–78. 
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Branch from 1888 through 1899, with predictable health conse-
quences for the offenders: throughout the 1880s, 14 percent of 
all diseases and injuries diagnosed among the residents were 
somehow tied to drinking. To combat this menace, the board 
of managers opened a Keeley institute on the home’s grounds, 
and the local GAR chapters railed against the use of their name 
and logo in taverns. The managers were somewhat successful 
on the home’s grounds—by the mid-1890s, more than 400 
men had joined the branch’s Keeley League—but enterprising 
tavern-keepers named their gin mills after heroes of the Union 
army and replaced official GAR paraphernalia with discreet 
notices that they employed GAR members.26  
 The officers of the ISH hoped that the state’s 1885 prohibition 
law would prevent such scenes in Marshalltown, but they were 
disappointed. Indeed, an 1887 Supreme Court case bestowed a 
little notoriety on the city when, after a committee of concerned 
citizens impounded a shipment of 5,000 barrels of beer passing 
through from Chicago, the court ruled that the interstate com-
merce clause superseded Iowa’s prohibition law.27 In a further 
blow to the managers’ efforts, prohibition was repealed entirely 
in 1889, thanks in large part to the defection of many GAR men 
from the Republican Party on that very issue. The GOP would 
return to power in the next election (indeed, the Democrats 
would not recapture the statehouse until the 1932 Roosevelt 
landslide), but prohibition was a dead letter. The ISH could, and 
did, banish drinking from the grounds, but the officers could do 
little about the prevalence of alcohol in the community.28 
 That had predictable effects. “It is a curious feature, in con-
nection with public opinion,” Commandant John Keatley wrote 
in his first biennial report to the legislature, “that many persons, 
on account of the intemperance of a few, are apt to characterize 
the entire membership of a soldiers’ home as a ‘lot of drunken 
                                                
26. James Alan Marten, “Nomads in Blue: Disabled Veterans and Alcohol at 
the National Home,” in Disabled Veterans in History, esp. 279–82. 
27. Bowman vs. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company 125 U.S. 465 (1887). 
See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol= 
125&invol=465, last accessed 9/15/2011.  
28. Mindling, “The GAR in Iowa Politics,” 68; New York Times, 3/21/1888, 4; 
Bowman vs. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company. 
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bums.’” It was more than “a few,” however. In 1893 ISH surgeon 
G. W. Harris estimated that up to 10 percent of the home’s resi-
dents were heavy drinkers and could be seen intoxicated “on 
the streets of Marshalltown” in their uniforms. In Surgeon Har-
ris’s opinion, that number was certainly large enough “to taint 
the reputation of the Home” among the citizens. He fully sup-
ported Commandant Keatley’s decision to have “a calaboose” 
built on the home’s grounds “to separate persons in a gross 
state of intoxication, from other well disposed members of the 
Home, who otherwise, would be . . . subjected to the annoyance 
of their profanity and other misconduct, due to their condition.”29  
 Even when sober, though, the behavior of typical ISH resi-
dents did little to dispel the notion that soldiers’ homes were full 
of bums. All soldiers’ homes, state or federal, served primarily 
working-class or even homeless veterans. The Iowa legislature’s 
visiting committee, sent to inspect the ISH in its first full year of 
operation, reported that a “very large proportion of the inmates 
are homeless, and have no relations in the State, and many re-
port no known relations living.” Fifty-five of the first 66 entrants 
were single, and a “large per cent” of the 120 applications then 
outstanding came “from parties now in the alms houses of the 
State, and for those dependent upon the various charitable so-
cieties to which they belong for their subsistence.”30  
 
WORSE YET, by 1887 most veterans nationwide were well 
aware of the “charitable” nature of soldiers’ homes and tended 
to use them the way other down-at-the-heel men used poor 
farms, workhouses, and even prisons: as seasonal refuges in 
tough economic times. As a result, soldiers’ homes tended to be 
more crowded in winter months and at other times when casual 
labor was scarce.31 As it was a veteran’s prerogative to request a 
                                                
29. Commissioners Report, 1893, 18. 
30. Report of the Joint Committee of the 22nd General Assembly of the State of Iowa, 
Appointed to Visit the Iowa Soldiers’ Home Located at Marshalltown (Des Moines, 
1888), 2 (hereafter cited as Visiting Committee Report). This ratio was even higher 
than the National Home’s 60 percent. See Kelly, Creating a National Home, 133. 
31. Kelly, Creating a National Home, 128, 155–59. See also Michael B. Katz, In the 
Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, 10th anniversary 
ed. (New York, 1996). 
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discharge at any time, though, many old soldiers, especially pen-
sioners, frequently left the homes to take up seasonal work—or, 
worse, to go on drinking sprees.32 The constant movement of 
men one step above destitution in and out of the home made 
the appearance of soldierly discipline even more critical for 
those who remained. 
 In general, though, only the sickest men stayed put. Alfred 
Renshaw, for instance, was an ex–prisoner of war suffering from 
a suppurating ulcer on his right leg and a “lame back and hip.” 
Submitting to Surgeon Duffield’s examination in 1894, Renshaw 
was found to have an enlarged heart and left kidney, along 
with an “impaired” right hand. He died at the home.33 More 
typical were men like George Strabow, who left the ISH three 
times between 1887 and 1899 and was readmitted twice. Al-
though he was blind in both eyes and suffering from a hernia 
that had gotten him dismissed from the Iowa College for the 
Blind because he could not “work hard enough and fast enough 
to make a living,” Strabow preferred life on the outside to the 
stifling regulations of the ISH. He was discharged for the last 
time on August 25, 1897, at his own request “rather than com-
ply with pension rules.”34 
 This pattern of discharge and readmission was common at 
the ISH. Former cavalryman Henry Tracy, a farmer in civilian 
life, entered the ISH in December 1887. Suffering from chronic 
diarrhea, piles, and “a general breaking down of the system,” 
Tracy nevertheless discharged himself in the summer of 1894, 
only to return in May 1895. William Stone, a single laborer suf-
fering from rheumatism “contracted at Fort Donelson,” was 
discharged and admitted four times between 1887 and 1893. 
Noah H. Isenhower, late of the 31st Iowa, was admitted three 
times between 1887 and 1899, including once after being 
dropped from the rolls in 1897. He died of pneumonia in the 
home in 1910. Patrick Neville, whose army service ended in Oc-
                                                
32. Kelly, Creating a National Home, 142–44. 
33. ISH case file 1248 (Alfred Renshaw, pension certificate #944614), 11/12/ 
1894, Iowa Veterans’ Home, Marshalltown, Iowa. I am grateful to the admin-
istrators of the Iowa Soldiers’ Home at Marshalltown for their invaluable 
assistance with this project. 
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tober 1861 when he was paroled after capture, was readmitted 
an astounding nine times starting in January 1888. Neville was 
not even disabled in the line of duty: “After my discharge I 
was working on a hospital boat running from Memphis to 
Pittsburg,” he reported on his ISH application. Approximately 
one week after mustering out, “I was caught in the machinery 
of the boat and lost my right arm.” Neville exemplified the pat-
tern of seasonal discharges common to both the ISH and the 
NHDVS. Outside the home, he somehow got by as a common 
laborer despite his infirmity until 1890, when he finally received 
a $12 per month pension under the Dependent Pension Act. He 
died at the home in the spring of 1902.35  
 
WITH THIS MUCH MOVEMENT—and Neville, Tracy, and 
the rest represent a tiny fraction of the thousands of men who 
passed through the ISH between 1887 and 1910—it was crucial 
for ISH officers to maintain soldierly discipline on the grounds. 
Iowans expected to see their veterans cared for, but they de-
manded that old soldiers prove themselves worthy of largesse 
by comporting themselves as veterans. Thus they were closely 
regulated in appearance and manner. The inmates wore “the reg-
ular G.A.R. uniform,” an inmate told the Lyon County Register 
in early 1888, “with G.A.R. buttons, blue flannel shirt and black 
hat with gold cord and tassel, and a change of underclothing.” 
This particular veteran was happy with his lot—he called the 
ISH a true “home for the old broken down soldier not only in 
name, but in the fullest sense of the term”—but the uniform, 
with its attendant inspection, grated on many others. 36  
 Nevertheless, it was not optional. Rule 14 mandated that 
“inmates shall appear at all times, in the uniform or dress estab-
lished by the Board of Commissioners”; and Rule 15 specified 
that “at reveille the inmates shall rise, wash and dress them-
selves neatly; and when assembled for breakfast, before enter-
ing the dining room, the officer in charge of each detachment, 
                                                
35. ISH case file 33 (Henry Tracy [no pension certificate]), 12/15/1887; ISH 
case file 48 (William Stone, pension certificate #254544), 12/28/1887; ISH case 
file 53 (Noah H. Isenhower, pension certificate #275779), 12/31/1887; ISH case 
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36. Lyon County Register, 1/20/1888.  
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shall inspect his men and report any neglect to the comman-
dant.” This “neglect”—which could be any failure of soldierly 
demeanor—could be punished by fatigues. In veteran parlance, 
that was being “put on dumps,” and it could entail extra work 
on the inmate-run farm, a stint as a nurse in the ISH hospital, or 
even the kinds of pointless make-work punishment details they 
had suffered in the army some 30 years earlier—marching a 
fixed number of circuits or moving piles of firewood from one 
place to another. More serious infractions could be punished by 
a spell in the guardhouse or even expulsion.37  
 Movement was regimented in military fashion. Those who 
were physically able were liable to be assigned to work details 
(compensated, in 1890, at the rate of 30 cents per day; the free-
market rate was 44 cents per day). Those who were sick were 
obliged to wait until the morning’s sick call before being al-
lowed to report to the surgeon’s office. Access to “the barns, 
stables, shops, kitchens, laundry, or detached buildings, with-
out permission of the Commandant” was forbidden, and fur-
loughs were required to leave the grounds. The day ended with 
a military-style tattoo from the bugler, at which point all resi-
dents were required to repair to their rooms and prepare for 
lights-out.38 Presumably the lights-out rule was loosened for 
meetings of the in-home GAR post organized in August 1888, 
but otherwise the veterans lived in the home much as they had 
in camp 40 years earlier—with the exception, of course, of the 
watchful eyes of curious civilians.39 
 
IN SHORT, the officers and residents of the ISH were forever 
engaged in a complex negotiation between charity, discipline, 
                                                
37. These and all subsequent ISH rules quoted can be found, unless otherwise 
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and disability. In return for desperately needed asylum care, 
veterans who entered the ISH were expected to play the part of 
wounded warriors. The fact that they were not the conquering 
army of their youth, however—and were, in fact, rapidly pass-
ing into senescence—added an element of farce to the proceed-
ings that the veterans deeply resented. The simplest explanation 
for the drinking problems that plagued all soldiers’ homes, for 
instance, is that drinking was one of the few recreations avail-
able. The nineteenth century simply had no experience with the 
long-term care of non-deviant populations. Workhouses, insane 
asylums, prisons, orphanages, and even schools for the disabled 
were intended as temporary refuges for the rehabilitation of 
society’s outcasts.40 The ISH and its sister institutions were, in 
effect, prototypical nursing homes, but it would take until the 
twentieth century for medicine to devote any serious attention 
to the elderly and their unique problems. Soldiers’ homes thus 
were often little more than warehouses for chronically ill old 
veterans who were forced to play dress-up for their daily bread. 
 In some ways, the ISH was actually better than most state 
soldiers’ homes—and even some branches of the NHDVS. The 
Iowa home, for instance, maintained a farm, a sewing room, a 
carpenter shop, a bakery, and a laundry, all staffed with inmate 
labor; veterans could earn a little pocket money and still feel 
like somewhat productive members of society.41 The North-
western Branch of the NHDVS, by contrast, employed less than 
a third of its members; perhaps not coincidentally, its residents 
were plagued by a variety of maladies that seemed to be the 
result of simple despair. Elizabeth Corbett, whose father had 
been an officer there in the late 1800s, left a vivid description of 
                                                40. On poorhouses, see especially Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse. For other 
institutions, see especially Benjamin Reiss, Theaters of Madness: Insane Asylums 
and Nineteenth-Century American Culture (Chicago, 2008). The classic studies re-
main Gerald N. Grob, Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875 (New 
York, 1972); and Gerald N. Grob, From Asylum to Community: Mental Health 
Policy in Modern America (Princeton, NJ, 1991). On prisons, see especially Ran-
dall G. Shelden, Controlling the Dangerous Classes: A History of Criminal Justice 
in America, 2nd ed. (Boston, 2008). For deaf schools, see especially Douglas C. 
Baynton, Forbidden Signs: American Culture and the Campaign against Sign 
Language (Chicago, 1996). 
41. Commissioners Report, 1905, 36–37. 
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the old soldiers whiling away their time. They “rarely bathed 
and frequently swore,” historian James Marten summarizes, 
and “their offbeat hobbies” included “collecting burned matches, 
manufacturing and wearing counterfeit medals, ‘curing’ deadly 
diseases, and proposing to women visitors, inevitably claiming 
to have run away to become drummers in the Union army as 
little boys.”42 With nothing to keep them occupied, veterans at 
Milwaukee’s NHDVS slipped into torpor. 
 Age compounded the problem. Although it was better pro-
vided with pastimes than most, even the ISH could not arrest 
the ravages of time. Indeed, a large portion of the ISH’s mem-
bership was aged and simply incapable of doing meaningful 
work from the day the institution opened its doors. “Many of 
the inmates are well advanced in years,” Commandant Milo 
Smith wrote in 1889, “or are broken in health from exposures or 
wounds, and quite a large per cent of them require medical 
treatment and attention which cannot be given them without 
additional hospital facilities.” Moreover, the designers of the 
home had not allowed for the age of the inmates in their plans, 
placing the kitchen in the basement. For the inmates who served 
as nurses for their fellows, the arrangement forced a climb “up 
a long flight of stairs by men that can with difficulty go up and 
down stairs without any load.” So, too, presumably, with the 
farm, which had begun operation the previous year. Given that 
an inability “to earn a ¼ living at manual labor” was one of only 
two admission criteria, it stands to reason that the climb from 
the basement was a trial for just about any veteran sick enough 
to gain admission.43  
 
PAST THE TURN of the twentieth century, the size, frequency, 
and complexity of geriatric problems increased. By 1905, Com-
mandant C. C. Horton was pressing the legislature to consider 
tax increases to support a new hospital. “In view of the advanc-
ing age of our members,” he wrote in his biennial report for that 
year, “more citizen help will doubtless be required in the near 
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340      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
future.” He reminded his superiors that “many new members 
are hospital patients from the start,” and he reiterated the home’s 
perennial request for additional funding. He also begged for 
appropriations to construct a separate library, as the present 
one was “altogether too small and will, at best, accommodate 
but about twenty-five members at a time.” With fewer members 
physically able to work in the home’s shops and farms, hospital 
beds and reading room space were fast becoming top priorities. 
Surgeon Duffield concurred—in his estimation, the year 1920 
would find the home “crowded to overflowing,” and he antici-
pated that the upcoming winter of 1905 would find the hospital 
“more crowded . . . than ever before.” Although the ISH was 
chronically understaffed, by this time Duffield was provided 
with a superintendent of nurses, an assistant nursing superin-
tendent, a hospital steward, a consulting surgeon, and an assis-
tant surgeon. But it was still not enough. Between June 1904 and 
June 1905, 456 residents were treated in the hospital; another 
1,008 were treated in their quarters; and medicines were issued 
to patients in their quarters an astounding 7,498 times. On aver-
age, 118 persons were in the hospital monthly during that year.44  
 With that level of illness, and few resources with which to 
profitably pass the time, it is little wonder that many residents 
of soldiers’ homes turned to drink and other forms of misbe-
havior like the ones documented by Elizabeth Corbett. More-
over, evidence from the modern era suggests that even the most 
well-intentioned institutions soon impress a strict behavioral 
code on their members—in short, they become total institutions, 
to employ sociologist Erving Goffman’s characterization of mod-
ern custodial facilities. In a total institution, residents’ “every 
movement is controlled by the institution’s staff.” Soon “an 
entirely separate social world comes into existence within the 
institution, which defines the inmate’s social status, his relation-
ship to all others, his very identity as a person.” In a total insti-
tution, personalities become flattened; with few avenues for 
the effective expression of the individual self, inmates can only 
resist depersonalization through small infractions. With their 
movements, gestures, and even attitudes closely monitored, 
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inmates of total institutions tend to “act out” in bizarre, irra-
tional ways. Clearly the price of care was very high for Iowa’s 
disabled veterans. 45  
 
TOTAL INSTITUTIONS affect the staff almost as much as 
they do the patients, though. The pressure of competing and 
often contradictory priorities pushed ISH officers into some odd 
behavior of their own. A case study is useful. When George W. 
Bettesworth, late of the 2nd Iowa Infantry, applied for admis-
sion in the spring of 1902, he was in his mid-sixties, about the 
average age of Union veterans at the time. Like most inmates, 
he was a casualty of disease rather than wounds. Generally 
“feeble,” he was suffering from chronic diarrhea, hemorrhoids, 
and a latent case of malaria. Home Surgeon Duffield concluded 
that Bettesworth was “unable to earn a ¼ living at manual la-
bor” and on that basis provisionally approved his admission.46  
 In one crucial respect, however, Bettesworth was far from 
typical. His mind was “agitated,” he claimed on his application, 
and Duffield concurred. He pronounced Bettesworth “med-
ically deranged” and added, “I am inclined to think he is not a 
fit subject for us. His place is in the asylum.”47 Nonetheless, Duf-
field admitted Bettesworth into the home on May 27, 1902, and, 
except for a brief stay in the Minnesota Soldiers’ Home in Hen-
nepin County, just outside of Minneapolis, he would remain at 
the ISH until his death in 1917.48 Moreover, the mental agitation 
he displayed at his admission physical would, by 1905, blossom 
into a set of obsessive delusions about the mystical connection 
between various biblical figures, electric current, the geography 
of Iowa, the cabbala, and a number of other widely divergent 
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subjects. As evidenced by a series of manuscripts held at the 
Bakken Museum in St. Paul, Minnesota, and the State Historical 
Society in Iowa City, Bettesworth pursued his delusions with 
the active support of the ISH staff. His writings are dense with 
allusions to current events and contain many clippings of cur-
rent newspapers that could only be obtained through the ISH 
library; most surprisingly, the manuscripts are printed with the 
ISH imprint on the front matter.49  
 Duffield’s decision to not only admit but also to abet Bettes-
worth only makes sense within the context of the negotiations 
discussed above. The ISH was not obligated to retain the men-
tally ill. Indeed, within a few months of its opening, the state leg-
islature’s visiting committee asserted the right to refuse admis-
sion to mentally impaired old soldiers. “Men requiring continual 
care by reason of insanity or imbecility,” the committee decreed 
in its 1888 report to the General Assembly, “will not be retained 
at the Home, because no provisions have been made to take care 
of such persons.” The commandant was given authority to refuse 
or transfer such cases.50 However, complaints about the “harm-
less but incurably insane” who were “daily” swelling the ranks 
of the ISH were a regular feature of Surgeon Duffield’s reports.51 
 Financial considerations made “harmless” lunatics a valu-
able source of support for the ISH. The Iowa GOP made much 
political hay out of the initial $75,000 appropriation for the ISH 
in 1886, but in reality the institution was—and would remain—
pathetically underfunded. In 1890, by contrast, the state offered 
the Soldiers’ Monument Commission $100,000 to fund a memo-
rial to Iowa’s Civil War veterans outside the Capitol. Urging the 
state to “build nobly or not at all,” the monument commission 
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haughtily declared that “twice that sum at least will be required 
to erect a work that will in any full degree come up to the mark 
of this people’s patriotic feeling” and suggested raising $33,000 
yearly until that goal was met.52 In 1890 the entire appropriation 
for desperately needed new hospital facilities at the ISH was 
$25,000, and it was making do with a maintenance budget of a 
mere 10 dollars per man per month. This worked out to a mere 
13 cents per man per day spent on food, which was actually 
down from the 14.8 cents in the home’s first full year of opera-
tion. (Increased production on the inmate-worked farm, up to 
$899.79 from $481.23, was expected to counter the shortfall).53  
 Thus the retention of “harmless but incurably insane” old 
soldiers became a budgetary necessity for the ISH. Starting in 
1889, the Sundry Civil Act granted a $100 annual federal sub-
sidy for each man housed in a state soldiers’ home. Each man 
retained by the ISH would thus nearly double its per capita 
maintenance budget. Moreover, as with all other state and fed-
eral homes, inmates at the ISH were required to surrender the 
bulk of their pensions to the home’s support fund (though the 
Iowa home was “the most generous” of all, Commandant Hor-
ton bragged in 1900, in allowing its residents to keep $6 per 
man, an amount “far exceeding” that of other homes).54 With 
the Dependent Pension Act of 1890 making “all survivors of the 
war whose conditions of health are not practically perfect” eli-
gible for federal assistance, the ISH was increasingly assumed 
to be financially self-supporting. Add in the home’s obligation 
to pay for the upkeep of any men it remanded to the insane asy-
lum—there were five of them in 1890 at a cost of $14 per man 
per month—and the retention of harmless lunatics seemed the 
only sensible course.55 
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 The numbers provided by ISH officers and the legislature’s 
visiting committees bear this out. The federal government had 
provided an additional $16,865 in aid to the ISH through the 
end of 1888, but with those meager funds the ISH was expected 
to care for 350 veterans, including “nearly thirty cases that are 
practically bedridden of old chronic cases who entered the home 
in a helpless condition.” Moreover, the legislature’s visiting 
committee reported, “This class of cases would largely increase 
if the hospital accommodations of the Home would admit of it.” 
As it was, the ISH had already “been obliged to use two other 
wards for hospital patients, neither of which [had] the conven-
iences necessary for the comfort of the patients.”56  
 Lack of hospital funds would be a constant refrain in the 
home’s first two decades of operation. By the turn of the cen-
tury, the ISH was caring for over 600 men, with 77 more or less 
permanently in the hospital, with nothing like a proportional 
rise in its operating budget. The home’s hospital was thus “se-
verely taxed” during the “early fall, winter, and spring,” Duf-
field wrote in 1902, which led to “many needing its care [being] 
turned away.” The ISH simply could not afford to bypass any 
possible source of revenue—by 1900 it was retaining over $5,000 
per year in federal money from more than 500 pensioners 
among its residents.57  
 Still, by 1902, when George Bettesworth entered the home, 
Duffield had to provide care for more than 600 men for a mere 
$100 per month. By 1905 the total population of the ISH would 
surge to just under 800, with 369 of them age 68 or older.58 Thus 
Bettesworth—who, “medically deranged” or no, kept a keen eye 
on his federal benefits—would have been a good risk for Duf-
field if Bettesworth could keep his illness in check.  
 Moreover, Duffield was undoubtedly constrained by politi-
cal pressure. Benjamin Harrison’s successful presidential cam-
paign of 1888 accused Democrat Grover Cleveland of “weigh-
ing the claims of old soldiers with apothecary’s scales.” The Re-
publicans ousted Cleveland again in 1896 on the strength of the 
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soldier vote. After a brief lull in 1890, the GAR-dominated GOP 
would continue its dominance of Iowa’s statehouse until the 
1930s.59 Sending an old soldier to a state insane asylum under 
such conditions would be politically unwise, but especially so 
for Dr. Hamilton P. Duffield.  
 Like all officers of the ISH, Duffield was a Civil War veteran, 
but he owed his place almost entirely to the politicking of the 
home’s second commandant, John Keatley. Col. Keatley had ex-
plicitly lobbied the state legislature to remove the home’s current 
surgeon, Dr. G. W. Harris, on the grounds that Harris was not 
“a veteran of the late war.” Duffield, who had mustered out as a 
corporal in 1864, was installed as home surgeon with the rank 
of major in 1894—which year was, probably not coincidentally, 
the end of the tenure of Horace Boies, Iowa’s only Democratic 
governor between the end of the Civil War and the New Deal.60 
Duffield was no doubt a man who knew how to tread carefully. 
 Provided George Bettesworth could maintain the outward 
demeanor of a soldier, then, there were no disadvantages, and a 
great many advantages, to maintaining him at the home. From 
all remaining evidence, Bettesworth was obedient and tractable 
so long as he was free to pursue his peculiar hobby. Given the 
overcrowding of the hospital and the drunken antics of many 
members, it is likely that Bettesworth would hardly have ap-
peared on the institution’s radar at all. To Duffield, he was just 
one more feeble old man among many. To the visitors who 
flocked to the ISH to see the old soldiers on display, Bettes-
worth was just another aged veteran in a GAR uniform. So long 
as he could wear the uniform and march to the bugle, he was of 
little official interest to anybody.  
 By 1910, Duffield was urging the construction of “suitable 
quarters, an exercising yard and about four extra guards or 
orderlies” to supervise the increasing number of harmless but 
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senile old soldiers. With such facilities, “there would be no ne-
cessity for sending them to the hospital for insane.” Since “sol-
diers’ homes, national and state, were built largely from senti-
ment,” the new facilities would allow the public to see that even 
the feeblest were being cared for thoroughly and humanely.61  
 
“THE FACT REMAINS,” as historian Patrick Kelly wrote of 
the NHDVS, “that Union veterans received care in an asylum, 
albeit a relatively modern, comfortable, and humane one.” In a 
culture that did not tolerate large-scale institutional charity, the 
only way to maintain what was in effect a nursing home at tax-
payer expense was to constantly remind the public of the in-
mates’ sacrifices for the Union. To do that, soldiers’ homes like 
the ISH became tourist destinations, and the old soldiers were 
required to display themselves as wounded warriors—that is, 
they would perform their disability by marching in uniform and 
living under military discipline. Rosemarie Garland Thomson, 
Lennard Davis, and other historians of the subject argue that 
disability is essentially “performative”; that is, “disability” ex-
ists only in relation to a social construct called “normality,” and 
both are mutually interdependent. For those men who did not 
bear the “honorable scars” of combat, the only way to show that 
they were not drunks, bums, frauds, or loafers was through the 
uniform. Although they may have resented being spectacles 
“like monkeys at the Zoo,” their performance entitled them to 
what was at that time the most extensive and liberal public as-
sistance scheme in the world.62 
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